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Moral Dominion Over Dying: 
The Case for Mercy Death 
by Daniel C. Maguire 
Whether or not we have a right to intervene and encourage death when someone is in a 
dying way has been argued pro and con. The view that we ~o have a ~oral right to 
hasten the dying process by direct action is no longer on the frmges of ethu:tll thought or 
practice, but that view has become part of the mainstream. Reasons for this shift are 
explored in this essay. 
Some twenty-five years ago, my Uncle Dan came to 
our house for what were to be his final days. His 
condition was described by his doctor as "coronary 
deficiency." Even I, as a layman, observed that his 
heart was limping, his pulse irregular and weak. He 
had no strength except at terrible moments when 
sudden pain would strike parts of his body. When 
the pain struck, this old sick man would cry out 
with the strength of a young boy. The doctor 
opined that, with the weakness of his circulatory 
system, arteries or organs were collapsing and caus-
ing this appalling pain. 
One evening, I gave him two pills prescribed for 
sleeping. He fell asleep, but in 45 minutes he awoke 
screaming. The pains had returned. I rushed to the 
phone and called his doctor. The doctor could hear 
the cries of pain and knew immediately what was 
the problem. He asked if I had given him the two 
sleeping pills. I said I had, but only 45 minutes be-
fore. There was a long delay, filled with more ago-
nizing laments, and then the doctor said very delib-
erately and slowly: "Give him two more." I asked, 
"Could he tolerate two more?'' Again the deliberate 
response: "Give him two more." I did. The pain 
eased. He fell asleep and never awakened. The next 
morning when the doctor came to pronounce death, 
there was a wordless conversation between the doc-
tor who had made an anguished ethical choice the 
night before and the ethicist who had never worked 
or written on the topic. 
The problem the doctor faced was our moral do-
minion over the dying process. In some areas, the 
human family feels morally free to impose death. 
Massive death is imposed with patriotic pride in 
the slaughter called war. The killing of unarmed, 
lower economic class prisoners in capital punish-
ment is still popular and defended by conservative 
savants. These two crude forms of killing, which 
appear rational only because they are so long ten-
ured in custom and culture-the familiar comes to 
seem good-are finally receiving serious challenge 
in ethics. 
Simultaneously, our right to intervene and en-
courage death when someone is already in a dying 
way, is being rethought. The subject is not new to 
the human race, but the breadth of acceptance of 
the right to mercy death is a novelty in our moder-
nity. As my opening story illustrates, the subject has 
been acted upon under the pressures of crisis situ-
ations. Now practice and theory are being wed, and 
western culture is newly open to this serious ex-
pression of moral freedom. 
Mercy Death Today 
When I published the first edition of my book 
Death By Choice in 1973, I defended the moral right 
to accelerate the dying process by direct interven-
tion in certain circumstances.1 In the multiple re-
views and serializations of the book and in confer-
ences that flowed from it, I learned that there was a 
strong movement in thought and practice regarding 
mercy death. Since 1973, that movement has accel-
erated. 
Three to five percent of the deaths in the Nether-
lands are attributed to some form of mercy death.2 
The Netherlands is particularly interesting since, as 
is usually noted, it involves not so much a legaliza-
tion of mercy death as a privatization of it. Even 
when the law says that such actions are to be re-
3 ported, fewer than 2 percent are actually recorded. 
So the complicated legal regulations that have at-
tended this moral revolution in Holland have func-
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tioned as a pacifying backdrop for the blessing of 
individual and private choices by patients and doc-
tors. 
In an Australian poll, 76 percent of the general 
public supported physician-assisted mercy death. In 
a poll of Australian nurses, 66 percent said they had 
been asked by patients to accelerate the dying proc-
ess and 85 percent of this group had complied. 
In the United States, Washington state came close 
to legalizing mercy death, with 46 percent of the 
The breadth of acceptance of 
the right to mercy death is a 
novelty in our modernity. 
vote in favor of it. A majority of Americans in vari-
ous polls consistently judge mercy death to be 
moral and acceptable in certain circumstances. Phi-
losopher Margaret Battin says, "1 think that the 
United States will come to accept assisted suicide 
in the relatively near future, officially as well as 
. I ,s tactt y . ... 
The view that we have a moral right to hasten 
the dying process by direct action is no longer on 
the fringes of ethical thought or practice. My posi-
tion on mercy death now seems considerably less 
lonely than it did in 1973. 
Reasons For This Shift 
(1) Many years ago, the British historian Arnold 
Toynbee said that Americans treated death as 
though it were an un-American activity. Still, a cou-
ple of million Americans got away with it every 
year anyhow. What has happened since Toynbee's 
chiding is a cultural rite of passage. We have wit-
nessed a near-obsession with death and dying. 
Courses and lectures and books on the subject have 
multiplied during this transitional period. We have 
begun to look death in the face. Ethical reassess-
ment of death-related questions naturally flowed 
from this cultural mutation. 
(2) Medical advances also prodded this movement. 
For the ancients, death was not something to be 
sought. Life was short and often brutish. General 
longevity is a modem achievement. Now death can 
be desirable before it is medically allowed. Now too 
we know more about how to bring on death when 
terminal illness is marked by undefeatable pain. 
These technical advances have pushed the ethics of 
mercy death. 
(3) We have begun to face up to fraud. Mercy death 
has been going on, even here in the United States. 
Twenty-five years ago a study on the dying patient 
stated matter-of-factly, "There is considerable evi-
dence that doctors do terminate lives in certain situ-
ations."6 Our law did not cope with this. In Uru-
guay a law promulgated in 1933 says, "The judges 
are authorized to forego punishment of persons 
whose previous life has been honorable where they 
commit a homicide motivated by compassion, in-
duced by repeated requests of the victim."7 When I 
was writing Death By Choice I called the Uruguayan 
embassy to see how that law had been faring. I was 
told it was working well. The embassy official 
added, with some delicate hesitancy, that this law 
spared them "the embarrassments" of our system. 
His reference was to a celebrated case at the time 
where a mercy death had been "justified" by de-
claring the person doing it to be insane-although 
he clearly was not. In effect, we were playing cha-
rades to get the same results the Uruguayans got 
legally and candidly. Distaste for these charades is 
pressing the new ethics of mercy death. 
(4) Religious arguments are also arising in favor of 
mercy death. In 1985, a commission of the Re-
formed Churches of the Netherlands issued a re-
port in which it said that taking a life, in a mercy 
death situation, "is not necessarily without justifica-
tion in the light of faith."8 This is quite arguable. In 
my recent book, The Moral Core of Judaism and Chris-
tianity, I discuss a number of symbols and themes 
in Judaism and Christianity which could be used to 
argue for the morality of mercy death.9 
Jewish and Christian biblical religion was not fa-
talistic. It did not present persons as corks bobbing 
hopelessly in the currents of fate. Rather it pictured 
us as actors who could redirect the tides. When 
asked what we are like, it replied, "like God!" We 
were crafted in the image and likeness of God. We 
are take-charge "stewards" of the earth, not passive 
witnesses. Theology went on to call us co-creators, 
co-providers, and even participants in divine provi-
dence. These symbols functioned historically to give 
an enormous push to technology in areas influ-
enced by biblical symbolism. If something needs 
doing, those made in the image of God, who are 
vocationally partnered with God in the fashioning 
of creation, ought to get out and do it. In so doing, 
we are not "playing God," but simply being our 
God-like selves. 
From this base, it can easily be argued that 
death, which is always thought to be the enemy, 
may at last become the best remaining friend. Death 
might be the only feasible relief for unbearable suf-
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fering in a terminal illness. When that is the case, 
God-like people who are made to go for the good 
when they find it, might reach out for death. 
The alternative would be to say that when we 
enter the dying process, our God-like minds and 
wills are no longer supreme; we may not discern 
the good and choose it as we have done all our 
lives. Biology is now our destiny. God's will could 
be manifested only in the symptoms and timetable 
of our disease. This form of biological determinism 
is losing its grip today. 
Historically, mercy death 
has been acted upon under 
the pressures of crisis 
situations. 
(5) The classical objection to mercy death, with or 
without a physician's help, has had many names: 
the domino objection, the parade of horrors, the fin-
ger out of the dike, the camel's nose under the tent, 
the slippery slope, etc. It is the argument from ef-
fects which implies that since there are dangers as-
sociated with this exercise of freedom, we must 
place it under taboo. Usually, this argument falls 
back on the Nazi analogy. We will replicate the 
Nazi euthanasia experience if we allow any excep-
tions at all. This objection is still proffered by writ-
ers such as Daniel Callahan and Alexander 
Capron.10 
The argument is losing its force due to the expe-
rience of mercy death taking place with no ensuing 
parade of horrors. The Nazi experience of state-im-
posed death is not entertained seriously anywhere, 
making the analogy strained at best. The ancients 
had the best answer when they said abusus non tollit 
usum, meaning abuse does not rule out use. The 
fact that something can be abused does not mean 
that it cannot be intelligently used. Medical experi-
mentation has been abused here and everywhere 
else. We do not taboo it, but rather intelligently and 
sensitively and alertly work against the abuses. 
Mercy death must, however, be approached with 
reverent awe. As I wrote twenty years ago: "Life is 
the good thing and the precondition of all good 
things. Any decision to end it in any context, for 
self or for another, must be slow, deliberate, and 
reverential. But the life that is good, also bears the 
mark of the tragic. There are more times when the 
ending of life is the best that life offers. Moral per-
sons will see this, and then, more than ever, they 
will know the full price of freedom."11 
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